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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the instant
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (a) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1.

Whether the court of appeals, in the course of affirming

the summary judgment in favor of Grand County, failed to consider
the genuine issues of disputed material fact concerning equitable
estoppel.

Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine

issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

Landes

v.

Capital

City

Bank,

795

P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990) (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Utah

6

State

Coalition

of Senior

Citizens

632, 634 (Utah 1989); Geneva
648, 649 (Utah 1986)).

v.

Pipe

Utah Power

Co. v.

& Light,

S & H Ins.

Co.,

776 P.2d
714 P.2d

On certiorari, this Court does not review

the decision of the trial court but rather that of the court of
appeals, which this Court reviews for correction of error.
v.

Summit County, 2001 UT 10 f 10 (citing State

S.W.,

2000 UT 79, f8, 12 P.3d 80, 82); see

at 1129

(citing Madsen

v.

Borthick,

also

ex rel.

Harper

M.W.

and

Landes, 795 P.2d

769 P. 2d 245, 247

(Utah

1988) ) .
2.

Whether the court of appeals failed to consider the

property owners of the subject parcels of property in the instant
case to be necessary parties that should be joined as parties to
the action prior to a full and fair determination of the matters
at issue.
19

is

The court of appeals7 interpretation of Utah R. Civ. P.

accorded

correctness.

no

particular

Landes

v.

deference

Capital

(Utah 1990) (citing Madsen

City

v. Borthick,

Bank,

and

is

reviewed

for

795 P. 2d 1127, 1129

769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah

1988)).
3.

Whether the court of appeals erred in its interpretation

of Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-1, et seq. , and failed to consider the
genuine issues of material fact of whether the absent third-party
property owners qualify as occupying claimants pursuant to the
statute.

The

court

of

appeals7
7

statutory

interpretation

is

accorded no particular deference and is reviewed for correctness.
Landes

v.

Capital

City

Bank,

(citing Madsen v. Borthick,

795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990)

769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988)).

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
and regulations, whose interpretation is determinative in the
instant

appeal, are set out verbatim, with

the appropriate

citation, in the body and arguments of the instant brief.
STATEMENT QF THE CASE
This case arises out of the court of appeals' affirmance of
the district court's summary judgment in favor of Grand County,
the substance of which involves issues concerning necessary and
indispensable third parties not before the court, substantial
issues

of

material

fact

concerning

equitable

estoppel, and

material issues of fact concerning the statutory interpretation of
whether the property owners are occupying claimants pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-1 et seg.

Grand County initiated this

action against Mr. Lester W. Rogers, solely, alleging that Mr.
Rogers had

failed

to properly

subdivide various parcels of

property located in Grand County prior to selling the same. Grand
County, among other things, prayed for (1) an order enjoining Mr.
Rogers from further subdividing the subject property and from

8

selling any part of the entire parcel during the pendency of the
lawsuit, and (2) an order requiring Mr. Rogers to conform the
already conveyed parcels of property with the applicable zoning
and subdivision

ordinances.

Mr. Rogers

responded

to Grand

County's Complaint by denying the allegations in the Complaint and
cross-claiming against various doe parties that occupied the
parcels of property after having purchased the parcels from Mr.
Rogers.

By way of his Cross-Claim, Mr. Rogers sought judicial

partition of the property previously sold to the third parties.
Grand County shortly thereafter filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment.

Mr. Rogers responded by filing a Memorandum of Points

and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment, together with the Affidavit of Lester Rogers, in which
he raised various genuine issues of material fact.

In addition,

Mr. Rogers, through his counsel, requested oral argument on the
Motion for Summary Judgment.
The district court, without oral argument, granted summary
judgment by way of its Ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Thereafter, the district court signed its Judgment

(Enjoining

Violation of Subdivision Ordinance). Mr. Rogers, through counsel,
filed Notice of Appeal. This Court transferred the instant appeal
to the Utah Court of Appeals on December 27, 1999.

9

On June 2, 2000, the Utah Court of Appeals issued an
unpublished Memorandum Decision, in which it affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Grand County.
Grand County

v. Rogers,

See

2000 UT App 162, a true and correct copy

of which is attached hereto as Addenda D.

Mr. Rogers filed a

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which this Court granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

The instant case arose some time after Mr. Rogers sold

parcels of his property to various individuals not before the
Court.

The parcels of property sold by Mr. Rogers are located in

Thompson, Utah, which is situated in the outermost part of Grand
County.
2.

The conveyances of the parcels of property were accepted

and recorded by the Grand County Recorder's Office (R. 18-21,
Uniform Real Estate Contract, Warranty Deed, and Vacant Land Sales
Contracts attached to the Affidavit of Mary Hofhine in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment).
3.

Subsequent to the aforementioned sales, the various

third-party

property

owners

obtained

building

permits

and

extensively improved their parcels of property.
4.

Some five years after the sale of the first parcel of

property by Mr. Rogers, Grand County filed a Complaint against Mr.

10

Rogers, alleging that he had failed to properly subdivide the lots
prior to selling the same to the various third parties (R. 1-4,
Complaint).
5.

In its Complaint, Grand County, among other things,

prayed for an order requiring Mr. Rogers to conform the already
sold

parcels

of

property

with

the

applicable

zoning

and

subdivision ordinances (R. 3, Complaint).
6.

Mr. Rogers answered the Complaint, raising numerous

affirmative defenses, which included estoppel and waiver (R. 714, Answer and Cross Claim, pp. 2-4) .

In addition, Mr. Rogers

cross-claimed against various doe parties, alleging, among other
things, that the property should be partitioned

inasmuch as

various third parties possessed the subject property under color
of title as occupying claimants pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-64 (See id.
7.

at R. 11-12, pp. 5-6).
Shortly after the aforementioned pleadings were filed,

Grand County filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

Mr. Rogers

responded in opposition by filing a Memorandum of Points and
Authorities, supported by the Affidavit of Lester Rogers in which
Mr. Rogers argued that various genuine issues of material fact,
which included estoppel, partition, and the failure to join
indispensable parties, precluded summary judgment (See R. 29-39,
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff's
11

Motion
Rogers).

for

Summary

Judgment;

R.

3 6-39,

Affidavit

of

Lester

Mr. Rogers requested oral argument on the motion for

summary j udgment.
8.

Without oral argument, the district court ruled that

Grand County was "clearly entitled to an injunction . . .", and
that Mr. Rogers "has not raised any genuine issue of material fact
to preclude granting the relief."

(See R. 59-62, Ruling on Motion

for Summary Judgment, a true and correct copy of which is attached
hereto as Addenda A ) .
9.

Shortly

thereafter,

the

district

court

signed

the

Judgment (Enjoining Violation of Subdivision Ordinance), ordering
Mr. Rogers "to properly apply for and obtain subdivision approval
as to those parcels, which he has already subdivided and/or sold
contrary to law." (See R. 63-66, Judgment (Enjoining Violation of
Subdivision

Ordinance),

a true and correct

copy of which

is

attached hereto as Addenda B ) .
10.

Mr. Rogers, through counsel, filed Notice of Appeal (See

R. 67-70, Notice of Appeal) .
11.

On

June

2,

2 000,

the

court

of

appeals

issued

an

unpublished Memorandum Decision, in which it affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Grand County.
Grand

County

v.

Rogers,

See

2000 UT App 162, a true and correct copy

of which is attached hereto as Addenda D.
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12.

Mr. Rogers filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari,

which this Court granted (See Order granting Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as
Addenda E ) .
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS
1.

The equitable doctrine of estoppel requires proof of

three elements, which are (i) a statement, admission, act, or
failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later
asserted; (ii) reasonable action or inaction by the other party;
and

(iii) injury to the second party that would result from

allowing

the

first

party

to

contradict

or

statement, admission, act, or failure to act.

repudiate

such

In this case, the

Grand County Recorder accepted and recorded each document utilized
to memorialize the sale and conveyance of properties by Mr. Rogers
to various third parties. Grand County acknowledges accepting and
recording the previously mentioned documents.

By accepting and

recording those instruments, Grand County performed acts that are
inconsistent with its subsequent enforcement of the subdivision
ordinance.
In its unpublished decision, the court of appeals held that
11

the recording of the relevant instruments is for notice purposes

and is unrelated to the County's enforcement of zoning ordinances

13

. . . ."

The court's legal conclusion is in direct contravention

to the County Recorder's statutory duty to index deeds and other
instruments "partitioning or affecting the title to or possession
of real property" as well as the grantors and grantees of such as
set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-6 (1) (b) &

(c)

(1995).

Moreover, the County Recorder is required by Utah Code Ann. § 1721-22 (1995) to report changes in ownership "where only a part of
the grantor's property is currently conveyed" and then "transmit
an additional form showing a full legal description of the portion
retained."
In addition to the acceptance and recording of instruments,
the parties, to whom Mr. Rogers sold and conveyed the subject
properties, possessed and made extensive valuable improvements to
their individual parcels of property. At oral argument before the
court of appeals, Grand County essentially acknowledged that the
building permits issued to the buyers of Mr. Rogers' property
obtained building permits, which allegedly were mistakenly issued
by Grand County.

The application of equitable estoppel to the

instant case is particularly appropriate inasmuch as Grand County
waited over five years after the sale of the first parcel of
property by Mr. Rogers to Ms. Betty L. Relitz and almost a year
and a half after the last sale to file a Complaint against Mr.

14

Rogers, alleging that he had failed to properly subdivide the
subject property prior to selling the same to third parties.
The court of appeals failed to consider the disputed material
facts that the subject parcels of property had been extensively
improved or that Grand County had substantially delayed its
enforcement of the subdivision ordinance.

Moreover, the court of

appeals' legal conclusion that Grand County was not estopped is in
direct conflict with this Court's decision in Young where this
Court stated that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies "when
a county committed an act or omission upon which the developer
could rely in good faith in making substantial changes in position
or incurring extensive expenses."

Further, the court of appeals

failed to consider that the disputed material facts in the instant
case constitute "something beyond mere ownership of land . . . ."
When properly considered, these disputed material facts constitute
the exceptional circumstances contemplated for the application of
estoppel against Grand County.
2.

The court of appeals' decision evinces the failure to

consider the arguments set forth in the Brief of Appellant
squarely before the court, where Mr. Rogers argued that according
to Rule 19(a)(1), the property owners to whom Mr. Rogers sold
parcels of the subject property are necessary parties to the
litigation because in their absence complete relief cannot be
15

accorded among those already parties.

From 1994 through 1997, Mr.

Rogers sold and conveyed various parcels of the subject property
to bona fide third parties. By virtue of the claims asserted by
Grand County, the interests of the third party property owners who
are not parties

u^

uhi& action

are

directly

adverse

to the

interests asserted by Grand ^ounty inasmuch as Grand County, by
J L< »w o c :< zr i

wa) of th :i o < < no< :
subdivi s ion

ordinance

the reqi ] i r ements :: f the

::: enfc i: ce

propert ies

owned

by the thi rd - party
s Cc \ i: ip] c

property o\ ; i leu s

I

A c t i o n f o r u:r:.T.i:

Judgment demonstrate

s

;•:,/•; n e c e s s a r y t h e t h i r d -

Complaint and Motion, Grand County asserted that Mr. Rogers' sales

and conveyances of the subject parcels of property are void.
In addition to the arguments under subsection (1) , the absent
property

owners

are

necessary

parties

under

subsection

(2)

inasmuch as they have an interest relating to the subject property
and are so situated that the disposition,,, of the action i n their
absence

may

interest.

impair

oi

impede

their

mtere:"',v

there:-

to protect

that

For example, the district court's judgment constitutes

a j udgment ilen upon une r-:.! - • •
the

ability

~.r r "•

/hsent

:

tnirci party

;;:i!

tl n is e n c i iiiibei: , i n„„g

property

owners and

subdivision ordinance requirements upon the third-party property
owners without any response or opposition to the enforcement.
The court of appeals also failed to consider that the
district court's present disposition may subject Mr. Rogers to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations in order to comply with the district
court's ruling as it is presently fashioned.
could

legally

comply with

the district

Even if Mr. Rogers

court's

order, such

compliance would subject Mr. Rogers to multiple obligations that
would likely be incurred by actions filed by the absent thirdparty property owners against Mr. Rogers to defend their interests
or otherwise shift responsibility for assessments incurred by the
subdivision ordinance requirements.
Without little or no consideration of the joinder issue, the
court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment, in which the
district court ordered Mr. Rogers to apply and obtain subdivision
approval for the parcels of property already sold to third parties
not before the court.
compliance

The district court ordered Mr. Rogers'

notwithstanding

that he does not

have

the legal

capacity or right to bring the previously sold and conveyed
parcels of property into compliance with the applicable zoning and
subdivision ordinances because ownership of the parcels, whether
deemed legal or equitable, now lies with absent third parties.
17

In tliu course

of concluding

that

the buyers

to whoi n Mr.

Rogers sold parcels of property are not necessary parties under
Rule 19 f the court of appeals failed to consider the two general
factors in Utah R. Ci v.
appeals

ignored

By so doing,

this court's decision

which this Court

held

that

before the roi u: t p r e v ei its
plaintiff's

P. 19(a).

claim,"

the court of

in B0nnevuie

the "failure

Tower,

to bring

in

all parties

:ii 1: fi : c n: i pi op<

Finally,

:

the court

of

appeals'

:ecis.on

con f] :i cts ; :i tl 1 tl :i :i s Coi 11: t: s deci s:i 01 :i :i i i S t : J i< a \ ' Sa It
11 Utah 2d 196, 356" P. 2d S'M
11

cj r a n t ; e e o

i "i d e e i I.1. , i In

t

637 (.196M), where this Court held

>/d.l i d i i }

I

'I'I'II i

i 11 i ' uiidi i

J

I I at ik ' i < > b e

necessary parties.

ARGUMENTS
I.

IN THE COURSE OF AFFIRMING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF GRAND COUNTY, THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED
TO CONSIDER THE GENUINE ISSUES OF DISPUTED
MATERIAL FACT.
A.

n

Summary Judgment Principles

'Summary ji ldgment i s appr opi: i ate oi :i 1 y v 1 lei I n c gei n :i li i le :i ssi ie

of material

fact

exists

judgment as c

•.*4 -

4.96,

±9^b>

497

(Utah

and the moving

is entitled

to

• :^

.'.'"
iqueuing

party

Higginx

18

-•

:

La<~-

' z:,

*y

55

P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c);1.

"The party

moving for summary judgment must establish a right to judgment
based on the applicable law as applied to an undisputed material
issue of fact." Lamb v. B & B Amusements
(Utah 1993).

Corp.,

869 P.2d 926, 928

"'[I]n reviewing a grant of summary judgment, [the

appellate court] view[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, '" which in this case is Mr. Rogers, the Petitioner. K & T,
Inc.

v. Koroulis,

888 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah 1994) (quoting

855 P,2d at 233); see also

Parker,

Higgins,

971 P.2d at 496-97.

The determination of whether a party is entitled to summary
judgment is a question of law, and therefore, this Court accords
no deference to the court of appeals' resolution of the legal
issues presented.
235; Ferree

v. State,

Parker,

971 P. 2d at 497; Higgins,

855 P. 2d at

784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) . In reviewing

the court of appeals' determination as to summary judgment, this
Court determines only whether the court of appeals "erred in
applying the governing law" and whether the court "correctly held

x

Rule 56(c) provides in relevant part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the
pleadings,
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories,
and
admissions
on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
19

that there were no disputed issues of material fact."
P. 2d at 15] (citing Bushnell

Real

Estate,

Inc.

746, 749 (Utah 1983)); Bowen v. Riverton

p>2d

\r

City,

Ferree,

784

Nielson,

672

656 P.2d 434,

436 (Utah 1982) ) .

B.

Genuine issues o- disputed material fact
exist as to whether Grand County is estopped
from enforcing its subdivision ordinance.

The equitable doctrine of estoppel requires proof of three
elements.
a

Those three elements are "(i) a statement; admission,
:i i I c o n s :i s t e n t: ; i :i t h a :::: 1 a :i i i: i

f<

later asserted;

(ii) reasonable action or inaction by the other

(
:
i :i ii ) :i i l j i n : y t : 11: le s econd p a:i : t;

p ,; '
allowing

the first

s ... -1 - ..
Casing'

Servs.,

party

.

to contradict

* / oi lII :ll i : € si i] t f :i : : i

or repudiate

I J ui i lej

, a ::t • :: r fa :i ] i ii e t ::: act

Inc.,

si ich
; l/i estates

1999 UT 100, 113 4 # 989 P.2d 1077 (citing CECO

Corp, v. Concrete Specialists,

Inc.. "

*

^h

1989) ) .
In Utah County
Supreme

Court

v

stated

Young,
that

61 5 P. 2d 1265 (I Jtah 1980), the Utah.
the doctrine

of equitable

estoppel

applies "when a county committed an act or omission upon which the
developer could rely in good faith in making substantial changes
in position or incurring extensive expenses."
Pasco

county

v.

Tampa Dev.

"- ? r.
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Id. r.*- ']?c.ri

~*r % "n ?'i " '

L

- citing

a.LL . App.

1978)); accord

Town of Alta

v. Ben Hame Corp.,

836 P.2d 797, 803

In short, u[e]stoppel, waiver or laches

(Utah Ct. App. 1992).

ordinarily do not constitute a defense to a suit for injunctive
relief against alleged violations" asserted by a county "unless
the

circumstances

Kartchner,

552

are

P.2d

Salt

exceptional."

136,

138

(Utah

Lake

1976).

County

To

v.

constitute

exceptional circumstances, "something beyond mere ownership of
land is required."

Stucker

v.

Summit

County,

(Utah Ct. App. 1994); Utah County v. Baxter,
1981); Young,

615 P.2d at 1267; Kartchner,

Town of Alta,

836 P.2d at 802-03.

870 P.2d 283, 290

635 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah
552 P.2d at 138-39;

Moreover, mere

u

[s]ilence or

Young,

615 P.2d

involves

material

inaction will not operate to work an estoppel."
at 1268.
A

determination

concerning

estoppel

questions of fact that preclude summary judgment, especially when
the parties dispute facts material to whether estoppel applies.
See van der Heyde v. First

Colony Life

Ins.

Co.,

(Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Moreover, a determination of whether

845 P.2d 275, 280

estoppel applies to a particular set of facts requires the fact
finder to consider testimony and therefore make

credibility

determinations about such testimony as it pertains to the elements
of estoppel.

Id. ; see generally

Singleton

v. Alexander,

2d 292, 294, 431 P.2d 126, 128 (1967); Sandberg
21

v. Klein,

19 Utah
576 P.2d

1291, 1292 (Utah 1978) (stating that even in cases where facts are
m.iL in "c<.. ... ..ete conflict" but the "understanding, intention, and
consequences" of the facts are disputed, the matters '"can only be
resolved by a trial").
in che case at bar, cue Grand County Recorder a'r^r.'recorded

each

document

conveyance or p

M ai y

Affidavi*

of

Motion for Summary Judgment

I Io £ 1 I i i ie

County

the

Grand

Irarra l"ou;:ty

County

Zoning

! i 11ni I L""'DiiiiLy lIle - in support

in

Judgment, ff2-4) .
Grand

•—;

* tester Rogers, %9)

. . -:
ILLS

the sale -.ind

•••

documents

of

to memorialize

;

(See ^ . 36-39, Affidavit:

I.:

vitalized

I

Support

of

(See R. 15-17, Affidavit of

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

S umma r y

By accepting and recording those instruments,

performed

acts

that

are

inconsistent

wi th

i ts

subsequent enforcement of the subdivision ordinance.

See
Uniform Real Estate Contract attached to the
Affidavit of Mary Hofhine in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment; R. 18.5, Warranty Deed attached to the Affidavit of
Mary Hofhine in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment;
R. 18, Vacant Land Sales Contract attached to the Affidavit of Mary
Hofhine in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; R. 21,
Vacant Land Sales Contract attached to the Affidavit of Mary Hofhine
i II Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; and R, 20,
Vacant Land Sales Contract attached to the Affidavit of Mary Hofhine
i n Support, of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
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In its unpublished decision, the court of appeals held that
"the recording of the relevant instruments is for notice purposes
and is unrelated to the County's enforcement of zoning ordinances
. . . ."

See Grand County

v. Rogers,

2000 UT App 162, pp. 1-2.

This legal conclusion by the court of appeals is in direct
contravention to the County Recorder's statutory duty to index
deeds and other instruments "partitioning or affecting the title
to or possession of real property" as well as the grantors and
grantees of such as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-6(1) (b) &
(c) (1995).

Moreover, the County Recorder is required by Utah

Code Ann. § 17-21-22 (1995) to report changes in ownership "where
only a part of the grantor's property is currently conveyed" and
then "transmit an additional form showing a full legal description
of the portion retained."
In addition to the acceptance and recording of instruments,
the parties, to whom Mr. Rogers sold and conveyed the subject
properties, possessed and made extensive valuable improvements to
their individual parcels of property (See R. 3 6-39, Affidavit of
Lester Rogers, flO) .

At oral argument before the court of

appeals, Grand County essentially acknowledged that the building
permits issued to the buyers of Mr. Rogers' property obtained
building permits, which allegedly were mistakenly issued by Grand
County. The application of equitable estoppel to the instant case
23

is particularly appropriate inasmuch as Grand County waited over
five years after the sale of the first parcel of property by Mr.
Rogers to Ms. Betty L. Relitz and almost a year and a half after
the last sale to file a Complaint against Mr. Rogers, alleging
that he nau iailed iu propc ~ y
prior

to

Telling

the

SUIJC i lv: [ ( j e

same

third

the subject

r;r~r-- --fy

' See

•,

parties

Cornpl a i i u
Nowhere in its unpublished decision did the c: ,*rt of appeals
• z o n s :i d e i: 11 ie

_

ate i i a ] f a <

:

:

property had been extensively improved or that Grand County had
.i.(- .-.-_.

i - iti/::

ordinance.

The

CCUIL

.".s

enforcemei it

of appeals' legal

:f

the

subd i /i si on

conclusion that Grand

County was not estopped is in direct conflict with this Court's
decision in Young

where this Court stated that the doctrine of

equitable estoppel applies "when a county committed an act or
omission upon which the developer could rely in good faith in
making substant ia1
expenses . "
County

v.

Utah

changes i n position or incurring

Cox iiifi]

Tampa Dev,

Corp.,

3r< : >i i z igf

extensive

62 5 I • 2 d : il 1 2 6' ]

364 S.2d 850 (FJ a. Ct

App

(c i 1 : i i lg Pa sec :>
1978)),

Fi lr t h e r , the cc i i:i : !:: : f appea] s fai] ed tc :::oris:i der that tl ie 5 i spi ited
material facts . ,

.-• instant case constitute '"something beyond

me' r e c >wiie

"d . . . . "

••

*

Sti z : " kt

8 ; 0 I 2 1 it 2 90

\ 71 .en

properly considered, these disputed material facts constitute the
24

exceptional circumstances contemplated for the application of
estoppel against Grand County.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
PROPERTY OWNERS OF THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF PROPERTY
TO BE NECESSARY PARTIES THAT SHOULD BE JOINED
PRIOR TO A FULL AND FAIR DETERMINATION OF THE
MATTERS AT
ISSUE.

xx

To determine

if a party is necessary, a court should

consider the two general factors in rule 19(a)" of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.3

Landes

1130 (Utah 1990) .

According to the first factor, a party is

v. Capital

City

Bank,

795 P.2d 1127,

necessary if uin his absence complete relief cannot be accorded
among those already parties."

See Utah R. Civ. P.

19(a)(1).

Under the second factor, a party is necessary if
he [or she] claims an interest relating to
the subject of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action in his [or
her] absence may (i) as practical matter
impair or impede his [or her] ability to
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of
the persons already parties subject to a
substantial
risk
of
incurring
double,
multiple,
or
otherwise
inconsistent
obligations by reason of his
claimed
interest.
3

In Cassidy v. Salt Lake Fire Civil Serv. Council,
97'6 P. 2d 607
(Utah Ct. App. 1999), the court of appeals recently stated that "a
party may raise the issue of failure to join an indispensable party
at any time in the proceedings, including for the first time on
appeal."

Id.

at 610 (citing Seftel

941, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd
Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990)).
25

v.

Capital

sub nom.,

City

Landes

Bank,

767 P.2d

v. Capital

City

See

Utah R. Crv

£'. 19(a)(2).

If the court determines that the

party i s necessary according to the aforementioned criteria, Rule
19 mandates that the party "shall be joined."4
"The basic purpose of rule 19 is 'to protect the interest of
absent persons as w e n db Liiose a'
multiple litigatior
[sat

r .: iconsisten-

h'r •

Kane, Federal

that

a p a r ty

4

• udicial

determinations. ' "

;. ,

Practice

and Procedure.

\e xuise Dt performing i\ :?ule
- :- . - r4

- TI

-_ :, .

1J

*i^ii

'? -

16 .;-. a- 21

a:ialys„, °^:.e JQJ-.L should

reasonina i-hat lead t-o *-^P conclusion

is L^ *« .x^^ necessary

under

rule

19 (a) or

Utah
Rule
of Civil
Procedure
19(b),
which
addresses
indispensable parties, provides:
If a person as described in Subdivision (a)(1)(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court
shall determine whether in equity and good
conscience the action should proceed among the
parties before it, or should be dismissed, the
absent
person
being
thus
regarded
as
indispensable. The factors to be considered by
the court include:
first, to what extent a
judgment rendered in the person's absence might
be prejudicial to him [or her] or those already
parties; second, the extent to which, by
protective provisions in the judgment, by the
shaping of relief, or other measure, the
prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third,
whether a judgment rendered in the person's
absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the
plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the
action is dismissed for nonjoinder,

indispensable under rule 19(b)."
Manygoats

v.

Kleppe,

Landes,

795 P.2d at 1130 (citing

558 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1977)).

In its unpublished decision, the court of appeals stated that
"Rogers has not argued that subsection (1) [of Utah R. Civ. 19]
applies

and,

under

necessary parties."
appeals

failed

subsection

subsection

(2), Rogers's

buyers

are

not

For the reasons set forth below, the court of

to consider Mr. Rogers7

arguments pursuant

(1) and erroneously concluded that the

to

third-party

buyers are not necessary parties under subsection (2).
First, the factors set out in subsections (1) and (2) of Rule
19(a) are disjunctive.

Notwithstanding, the court of appeals'

decision evinces its failure to consider the arguments set forth
at pages 26-27 of the Brief of Appellant, where Mr. Rogers argued
that according to Rule 19(a) (1), the property owners to whom Mr.
Rogers sold parcels of the subject property are necessary parties
to the litigation because in their absence complete relief cannot
be accorded among those already parties. Cf.
City,

Stone

v.

Salt

Lake

11 Utah 2d 196, 356 P.2d 631, 637 (1960) (holding "grantees

of deeds, the validity of which is under attack" to be necessary
parties).

From 1994 through 1997, Mr. Rogers sold and conveyed

various parcels of the subject property to bona fide third parties
(See R. 15-17, Affidavit of Mary Hofhine in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment, fH2-5; R - 36-39; Affidavit of Lester
27

Rogers, ff8-10) .5

By virtue of the claims asserted by Grand

County, the interests of the third party property owners who are
not parties to this action are directly adverse to the interests
asserted by Grand County inasmuch as Grand County, by way of this
case, now seeks to enforce the requirements of the subdivision
ordinance on properties owned by the third party property owners.
Moreover, both Grand County's Complaint and its Motion for Summary
Judgment demonstrate how necessary the third-party property owners
are to the instant litigation.

In its Complaint and Motion, Grand

County asserted that Mr. Rogers' sales and conveyances of the
subject parcels of property are void (See R. 3, Complaint, %2 of
the Prayer; R. 27-28, Amended Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; R. 41, Plaintiff's
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment).
In addition to the arguments under subsection (1), the absent
property

owners

are

necessary

parties

under

subsection

(2)

inasmuch as they have an interest relating to the subject property
and are so situated that the disposition of the action in their

5

The record reveals that Grand County failed to challenge or
contradict the fact that Mr. Rogers sold the parcels of properties to
various third parties not parties to the action.
Rather, Grand
County acknowledged the sales in the memorandum filed in support of
its Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 15-17, Affidavit of Mary Hofhine
in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, KU2-5; R. 3629) . Consequently, this fact became an uncontested fact for purposes
of summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).
28

absence may
interest.6
Tower

Inc.,

impair or impede their ability to protect that
See Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2); see

Condominium

Management

Comm. v. Thompson

also
Michie

Bonneville
Assocs.,

728 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1986) ("A plaintiff may not obtain

relief adverse to the property rights of others who are not
adverse parties to the case without bringing them before the
court.") . For example, the district court's judgment constitutes
a judgment lien upon the subject real property, thus encumbering
the interests of the absent third-party property owners and
thereby serving as the basis of enforcement

of the various

subdivision ordinance requirements upon the third-party property
owners without any response or opposition to the enforcement. See
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (Supp. 1999).
The court of appeals also failed to consider that the
district court's present disposition may subject Mr. Rogers to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations in order to comply with the district
court's ruling as it is presently fashioned.
19(a)(2).

See Utah R. Civ. P.

Even if Mr. Rogers could legally comply with the

district court's order, such compliance would subject Mr. Rogers
6

By virtue of the sales and conveyances by Mr. Rogers, the absent
third-party property owners have an interest in the subject real
property (R. 15-17, Affidavit of Mary Hofhine in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ff2-5; R. 36-39, Affidavit
of Lester Rogers, 1M[8-10) •
29

to multiple obligations that would likely be incurred by actions
filed by the absent third-party property owners against Mr. Rogers
to defend their interests or otherwise shift responsibility for
assessments incurred by the subdivision ordinance requirements.
Without little or no consideration of the joinder issue, the
court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment, in which the
district court ordered Mr. Rogers to apply and obtain subdivision
approval for the parcels of property already sold to third parties
not before the court (See R. 64, Judgment (Enjoining Violation of
Subdivision Ordinance)).
compliance

The district court ordered Mr. Rogers'

notwithstanding

that he does not have the legal

capacity or right to bring the previously sold and conveyed
parcels of property into compliance with the applicable zoning and
subdivision ordinances because ownership of the parcels, whether
deemed legal or equitable, now lies with absent third parties.
In the course of concluding that the buyers to whom Mr.
Rogers sold parcels of property are not necessary parties under
Rule 19, the court of appeals failed to consider the two general
factors in Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a).

See Landes,

795 P.2d at 1130.

The court of appeals also ignored this Court's decision in
Bonneville

Tower,

in which this Court held that the "failure to

bring all parties before the court prevents it from properly
reaching the merits of plaintiff's claim."
30

Bonneville

Tower, 728

P.2d at 1020.

Finally, the court of appeals' decision conflicts

with this Court's decision in Stone
196,

356 P.2d

631

v.

Salt

Lake

City,

(1960), where this Court held

11 Utah 2d
"grantees of

deeds, the validity of which is under attack" to be necessary
Stone,

parties.

356 P.2d at 637.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-6-1, et seq., AND FAILED TO
CONSIDER THE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT OF
WHETHER THE ABSENT THIRD-PARTY PROPERTY OWNERS
QUALIFY AS OCCUPYING CLAIMANTS.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-4(2) (a)

(Supp. 2000) 7 provides the

following:
Any person has color of title who has
occupied a tract of real estate by himself
[or herself] , or by those under whom he [or
she] claims, for the term of five years, or
who has occupied it for less time, if he [of
she] , or those under whom he [of she] claims,
have at any time during the occupancy with
the knowledge or consent, express or implied,
of
the
real
owner
made
any
valuable
improvements on the real estate, or if he [or
she] or those under whom he [or she] claims
have at any time during the occupancy paid
the ordinary county taxes on the real estate
for any one year, and two years have elapsed
without a repayment by the owner, and the
occupancy is continued up to the time at
which the action is brought by which the
recovery of the real estate is obtained.

7

A copy of Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-4(2) (a) (Supp. 2000) is attached
hereto as Addenda C.
31

(Bracketed material added).

The record on appeal reveals that the

absent third-party property owners, to whom Mr. Rogers sold the
subject parcels of property, have occupied the subject real
property and have made valuable improvements to their respective
parcels (See R. 36-39, Affidavit of Lester Rogers, %%6, 8, and
10).

In fact, at oral argument before the court of appeals, Grand

County acknowledged the improvements to the subject property in
the course of discussing building permits that had been issued to
the property owners.
Notwithstanding the previously stated plain language of the
statute, the court of appeals held that Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-1
through 8 (1994 & Supp. 2000) did not apply to the instant case.
See Grand County

v.

Rogers,

2000 UT App 162, pp. 2-3.

In the

course of its interpretation, the court of appeals stated that
Mt]he remedy sought by the County seeks neither to expel them nor
to encumber their property in any way."

See

id.

The court of appeals failed to consider both the plain
language of the statute and the genuine

issues of disputed

material facts under which the absent third-party property owners
and Mr. Rogers occupy the subject property and thereby have color
of title as against Grand County.
(Supp. 2 000) .

See Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-4

Moreover, genuine issues of material fact exist

concerning the interest and remedies that the property owners are
32

entitled to in light of the competing interests alleged by Grand
County in this action and whether the zoning and subdivision
ordinances of the County take precedence over the interests
provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-1, et seq.
2000).

(1994 & Supp.

See Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-3 (1994) (providing remedy for

parties to hold property as tenants in common).8
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Rogers respectfully asks that
this Court reverse the court of appeals unpublished decision,
affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of Grand County and remand the case for trial on the existing
genuine issues of disputed material fact and for any other relief
the Court deems appropriate.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of February, 2001.
ARNOLD X WIGGINS, P.C.

Scott—II Wiggins
Attorneys /or Petitioner

8

A copy of Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-3 (1994) is attached hereto as
Addenda C.
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CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused
to be mailed by First Class Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF PETITIONER to the
following on this 9th day of February, 2001:
Mr. W. Scott Barrett
Barrett & Daines
108 North Main, Suite 200
Logan, u£anN^4l
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ADDENDUM
Addenda A:
Addenda B:

Addenda D:

Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment
Judgment (Enjoining Violation of Subdivision
Ordinance)
Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-6-3 (1994) and 57-6-4
(Supp. 2000)
Unpublished Memorandum Decision of the court

Addenda E:

App 162
Order granting Petition for Writ of Certiorari

Addenda C:

Grand

of appeals:
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County

v.

Rogers,

2000 UT

Tab A

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County
FILED

JUN 2 1 1999

THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR^RAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GRAND COUNTY,
Plaintiff,

RULING ON MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

vs
LESTER W. ROGERS
Defendant.

Case No.

9907-38

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Plaintiff, Grand County (the "County" has moved the Court to
issue an injunction requiring defendant Lester W. Rogers
("Rogers") to comply with the subdivision law and prohibiting
further subdivision of his property.

Rogers has objected and the

matter has been fully briefed and submitted for decision.
The County is clearly entitled to an injunction against
additional sales. The County also seeks an order that Rogers
comply with the law as to sales already made.

Rogers defends on

the theory that the title of the purchasers cannot be affected,
that discovery is not complete, and that there are genuine issues
of fact.

In reply, the County disclaims any intention to cloud

the title of those purchasers.

It intends only to obtain Rogers1

compliance with the law.
Rogers has not raised any genuine issue of material fact to
preclude granting the relief.

He has also not shown what

1

discovery is needed before the motion can be considered.

The

motion is therefore granted.
Counsel for the County should submit a formal judgement
pursuant to Rule 4-504.

2

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 990700038 by the method and on the date
specified.
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NAME

Mail

MARK E. ARNOLD
ATTORNEY
AMERICAN PLAZA II, SUITE 404
57 WEST 200 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 841010000
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County
FILED
W. Scott Barrett (0228)

A

UG - k

1999

CLERK OAJTHE COURT
BY

BARRETT & DAINES
108 North Main, Suite 200
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone: (435) 753-4000
Facsimile: (435) 753-4002

fa
'

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

GRAND COUNTY,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT
(ENJOINING VIOLATION OF
SUBDIVISION ORDINANCE)

vs.

LESTER W. ROGERS,
Defendant.

Civil No. 9907-3i
Judge: Anderson

The above entitled matter came on regularly for decision before the undersigned sitting
without a jury on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment; and
The Court having determined that the matter has been fully briefed and submitted for
decision and having examined the proofs of the respective parties and the written arguments
submitted, W. Scott Barrett appearing for the Plaintiff, and Mark E. Arnold appearing as attorney
for the Defendant; and
The Court having issued its written ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on
the 21 st day of June, 1999, granting the Plaintiffs Motion.
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
1. That the Defendant and all persons acting under him be, and they hereby are, enjoined

from further subdividing the property described in the Complaint.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant be
required to properly apply for and obtain subdivision approval as to those parcels, which he has
already subdivided and/or sold contrary to law.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT,
postage prepaid, this 9th day of July, 1999, to the following:

Mark E. Arnold
Attorney at Law
American Plaza II, Suite 404
57 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Secretary

3

COURT CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 5™ day of AUGUST, 1999,1 mailed, postage prepaid, or
hand delivered, a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to the following:
W. Scott Barrett
BARRETT & DAINES
108 North Main
Suite 200
Logan, Utah 84321
Mark E. Arnold
Attorney at Law
57 West 200 South
Suite 404
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

TabC

57-6-3

REAL ESTATE

title, to recover value of his improvements to
extent that they unjustly enrich record owner
by enhancing value of his land. Reimann v.
Baum, 115 Utah 147, 203 P.2d 387 (1949).

claimants had constructed permanent improvements on the land. Reimann v. Baum, 115 Utah
147, 203 R2d 387 (1949).
—Value of improvements.
This section recogni2es the equitable rule
that the reasonable cost of the improvements,
alone, is not sufficient evidence of value, but
may be considered together with all other evidence of value in determining the increase in
value of the land on account of the improvements. Reimann v. Baum, 115 Utah 147, 203
P.2d 387 (1949).

—Separate action.
This section contemplates a separate action.
American Mut. Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Jones, 102
Utah 318, 117 P.2d 293 (1941), rehearing denied, 102 Utah 328, 133 P2d 332 (1943).
Evidence.
—Burden of proof.
The burden is on the occupying claimant to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
he acted in good faith in placing the improvements on the property. Erickson v. Stokes, 120
Utah 653, 237 P.2d 1012 (1951).
—Occupying claimants.
Evidence sustained finding that defendants
were not occupying claimants but were in possession as result of a trust. Sorenson v.
Korsgaard, 83 Utah 177, 27 P.2d 439 (1933).
—Permanent improvements.
In action to quiet title to three parcels of
realty and to recover damages, evidence was
insufficient to support finding that occupying

Good faith.
Occupant who placed the improvements on
the property during the pendency of the main
action did not act in good faith, although that
action remained pending for three years without the plaintiff's calling it up for trial, where
there was no indication that the main action
had been abandoned. The plaintiff's delay did
not amount to laches barring him from asserting lack of good faith against the occupant,
because the occupant could have called the case
up for trial himself, or could have moved to
dismiss for lack of prosecution at any time
during the period. Erickson v. Stokes, 120 Utah
653, 237 P.2d 1012 (1951).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Improvements §§ 42 to 47.

57-6-3.

C.J.S. — 42 C.J.S. Improvements § 9.
Key Numbers. — Improvements <*=» 4(6).

Rights of parties — Acquiring other's interest or
holding as tenants in common.

The plaintiff in the main action may thereupon pay the appraised value of
the improvements and take the property, but should he fail to do so after a
reasonable time, to be fixed by the court, the defendant may take the property
upon paying its value, exclusive of the improvements. If this is not done within
a reasonable time, to be fixed by the court, the parties will be held to be tenants
in common of all the real estate, including the improvements, each holding an
interest proportionate to the values ascertained on the trial.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2023;
C.L. 1917, § 5033; RJS. 1933 & C. 1943, 786-3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Equitable basis of recovery.
Evidence.
—Permanent improvements.
—Value of improvements.
Right to sale or partition of property.

Value of improvements.
—Fair market value.
Equitable basis of recovery.
This section ameliorates strict common-law
rule that record owner is entitled to improvements placed by another upon his property, and
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is based upon equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment, which entitles bona fide claimant,
who acted while in possession under color of
title, to recover value of his improvements to
extent that they unjustly enrich record owner
by enhancing value of his land. Reimann v.
Baum, 115 Utah 147, 203 P.2d 387 (1949).
Evidence.
— Permanent improvements.
In action to quiet title to three parcels of
realty and to recover damages, evidence was
insufficient to support finding that occupying
claimants had constructed permanent improvements on the land. Reimann v. Baum, 115 Utah
147, 203 P.2d 387 (1949).
—Value of improvements.
This section recognizes the equitable rule
that the reasonable cost of the improvements,
alone, is not sufficient evidence of value, but
such cost may be considered together with all
other evidence of value in determining the
increase in value of the land on account of the
improvements. Reimann v. Baum, 115 Utah

57-6-4

147, 203 P.2d 387 (1949)
Right to sale or partition of property.
This chapter contains no provision for sale of
the property or for application of the proceeds
to satisfying the interests of the parties. It
merely calls for a relationship of tenants in
common in the premises. A partition or other
separation of interests is the subject matter of a
different action. American Mut Bldg. & Loan
Co. v. Jones, 102 Utah 318, 117 P.2d 293 (1941),
rehearing denied, 102 Utah 328, 133 P2d 332
(1943)
Value of improvements.
—Fair market value.
Since this section requires that if the owner
retains the property he shall "pay the appraised value of the improvements," this was
properly regarded by the trial court as being
the fair market value in the usual understanding of that term and not as including any
special concealed value the property may have
had. Alleman v. Miner, 10 Utah 2d 356,353 P.2d
463 (1960).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — The Law
of Practical Location of Boundaries and the

Need for an Adverse Possession Remedy, 1986
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 957.

57-6-4. Certain persons considered to hold under color of
title.
(1) A purchaser in good faith at any judicial or tax sale made by the proper
person or officer has color of title within the meaning of this chapter, whether
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or not the person or officer has sufficient authority to sell, unless the want of
authority was known to the purchaser at the time of the sale.
(2) (a) Any person has color of title who has occupied a tract of real estate
by himself, or by tho^e under whom he claims, for the term of five years,
or who has occupied it for less time, if he, or those under whom he claims,
have at any time during the occupancy with the knowledge or consent,
express or implied, of the real owner made any valuable improvements on
the real estate, or if he or those under whom he claims have at any time
during the occupancy paid the ordinary county taxes on the real estate for
any one year, and two years have elapsed without a repayment by the
owner, and the occupancy is continued up to the time at which the action
is brought by which the recovery of the real estate is obtained.
(b) The person's rights shall pass to his assignees or representatives
(3) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to give tenants color of title
against their landlords or give any person a claim under color of title to school
or institutional trust lands as defined in Subsection 53C-1-103(6)
History: R.S, 1898 & C X . 1907, § 2024;
C.L. 1917, § 5034; ILS. 1933 & C. 1943, 786-4; L. 1995, ch. 299, § 25.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1995 amend-

merit, effective May 1, 1995, added the subsection designations, added the second clause in
Subsection (3) beginning "or give any person,"
a n d m a d e related and stylistic changes

NOTES TO D E C I S I O N S
B a s i s of claimant's right.
—Color of title.
The claimants to land allegedly owned by a
trust had color of title to their lots where the
trust knew that the claimants were improving

t h e land, encouraged them to do so, and in some
cases consented to the impro\ements Jeffs v
S t u b b s , 970 P 2 d 1234 (Utah 1998), cert de
med, 526 U S 1130, 119 S Ct 1S03 143 L Ed
2d 1007 (1999)
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JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge:
"In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we accord no
deference to the trial courtf s conclusions of law and review them
for correctness." Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678, 680
(Utah 1997). "[W]e view the facts and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party." Hiaains v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah
1993) .
Rogers first argues that the County is estopped from
enforcing its subdivision ordinance. The elements of equitable
estoppel are: "(1) an admission, statement or act inconsistent
with the claim afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party
on the faith of such admission, statement or act, and (3) injury
to such other party resulting from allowing the first party to
contradict or repudiate such admission, statement or act." State
ex rel. Parker v. Irizarrv, 945 P.2d 676, 680 (Utah 1997).
Specifically, Rogers asserts that the County's acceptance and
recordation of contracts and a deed for the sale of portions of
his acreage are acts inconsistent with the Countyfs current
position. We disagree. A county recorder has no discretion and
must record all instruments received. See Utah Code Ann. § 1 7 21-17(1) (1999). The recording of the relevant instruments is
for notice purposes and is unrelated to the County's enforcement

of zoning ordinances; it did not justify Rogers's inference that
the County was allowing subdivision of his property without
approval. Rogers also does not allege specific impending injury
if the County is allowed to enforce its ordinances here. On both
the first and third of the essential elements of equitable
estoppel, then, Rogers's defense fails as a matter of law.
Rogers next argues that the county waived its right to
enforce its ordinances against him. We decline to consider this
defense as it is not properly before us. For an issue to be
preserved for appeal, the district court must be given the chance
to consider it. See Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis
Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982). Because
Rogersf s memorandum to the district court did not address the
defense of waiver, Rogers failed to properly preserve this
defense for appeal.
Rogers also argues that his buyers are necessary parties
within the meaning of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). A
party is necessary if:
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties, or (2)
he claims an interest relating to the subject
of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in his absence may
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede
his ability to protect that interest or (ii)
leave any of the persons already parties
subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations by reason of his claimed
interest.
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a). Rogers has not argued that subsection (1)
applies and, under subsection (2), Rogers's buyers are not
necessary parties.
Though they likely may claim an interest, Rogers points to
no particular circumstance under which the buyers' ability to
protect their interests will be impaired or impeded by the
disposition of this case in their absence. Likewise, Rogers does
not specify how he would be subject to the risk of "double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations." Id. Because
Rogers alleges no facts which would meet the requirements of Rule
19, this argument also fails.
Though Rogers next invokes the Occupying Claimant's Act (the
Act), it is not apparent how it applies to this case. See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 57-6-1 to -8 (1994 & Supp. 1999). Rogers's buyers
are not threatened with the kind of action against their property
that the Act's protections contemplate. The remedy sought by the
990766-CA
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County seeks neither to expel them nor to encumber their property
in any way. The Act thus does not apply here.
Rogers also argues that the district court's grant of
summary judgment was improper before discovery. Such decisions
regarding discovery will be reviewed for abuse of discretion.
See American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930
P.2d 1182, 1195 (Utah 1996). Despite his argument that discovery
must generally precede summary judgment, a court need not allow
discovery when "the motion opposing summary judgment is dilatory
or without merit." Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d
275, 278 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The district court judge
apparently determined here that Rogers's opposition to the
County's motion was without merit. Further, Rogers did not then
and does not now offer any theories as to what material facts he
might obtain through discovery. Discovery is not allowed when
the party opposing the motion for summary judgment is "'merely on
a "fishing expedition."'" Id. (citations omitted). We thus
cannot say the district court abused its discretion in denying
Rogers's motion for discovery.
Affirmed.
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Ndrman H. Jackson,
Associate Presiding Judge
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
—00O00—

Grand County,
Respondent,
vs.
Lester W. Rogers,
Petitioner.

No. 20000672-SC
990766-CA

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, filed pursuant to Rule 48, of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed on August 2, 2000, by
petitioner is granted.
FOR THE COURT:

$c£i&t 2(?c®
Date

Richard C. Howe
Chief Justice

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on October 13, 2000, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was
deposited in the United States mail to the party(ies) listed below:
W. SCOTT BARRETT
BARRETT & DAINES
108 N MAIN ST STE 200
LOGAN UT 84321

SCOTT L. WIGGINS
ARNOLD & WIGGINS PC
AMERICAN PLAZA II STE 105
57 W 200 S
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101

and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand delivered to a personal
representative of the court(s) listed below:
SEVENTH DISTRICT, MOAB DEPT
ATTN: VICKY
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125 E CENTER ST
MOAB UT 84532
Paulette Stagg
COURT OF APPEALS
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Deputy Clerk
Case No. 20000672-SC
SEVENTH DISTRICT, MOAB DEPT, 9907-38

